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Browsing Preprinti (DF) / Preprints by Author "Podnieks, Karlis"

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    Explanation and Understanding in a Model-Based Model of Cognition
    (2017-11-20) Podnieks, Karlis
    This article is an experiment. Consider a minimalist model of cognition (models, means of model-building and history of their evolution). In this model, explanation could be defined as a means allowing to advance: production of models and means of model-building (thus, yielding 1st class understanding), exploration and use of them (2nd class), and/or teaching (3rd class). At minimum, 3rd class understanding is necessary for an explanation to be respected.
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    Towards a General Definition of Modeling
    (2010-11-24) Podnieks, Karlis
    What is a model? Surprisingly, in philosophical texts, this question is asked (sometimes), but almost never – answered. Instead of a general answer, usually, some classification of models is considered. The broadest possible definition of modeling could sound as follows: a model is anything that is (or could be) used, for some purpose, in place of something else. If the purpose is “answering questions”, then one has a cognitive model. Could such a broad definition be useful? Isn't it empty? Can one derive useful consequences from it? I'm trying to show that there is a lot of them.
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    Truth Demystified
    (2015-11-05) Podnieks, Karlis
    For further development, see Karlis Podnieks in ResearchGate. How could we recognize truth, if we only have models, means of model-building, and the history of their evolution? Where is the truth in the cloud of models – with so many of them already gone with the wind? We can define truths as more or less persistent invariants of successful evolution of models and means of model-building. What is true, will not change in the future (for some time, at least). This approach to truth could be named demystified realism (or, demystified theory of truth) – the kind of realism based on a minimum of metaphysical assumptions. (“Robotic realism” also would be appropriate, but the term is occupied already.)